and oversight, organic to no agency, and one that creates powerful disincentives for agency compliance with its goals. Its de novo standard of review conveys an absence of deference that is in tension with its provisions that delegate agency interpretative authority.
The academy and jurists alike vigorously debate many aspects of administrative law. Notwithstanding the numerous disagreements that exist in the intellectual discourse, there is consensus on the maxim that agency interpretation of a statute that is generally applicable to all executive branch agencies should not vary. 1 Congress consistently ignores this convention by choosing to craft FOIA and its amendments in broad language that invites and requires agency interpretation. This phenomenon recently presented itself in Chief Judge Merrick Garland's 2015 D.C. Circuit opinion in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission. 2 In that case, the court held an executive branch agency accountable for misreading two FOIA fee provisions in response to a FOIA request that sought a fee waiver based on public interest factors and recognition of the requester as a representative of the news media. 3 Such statutory misreadings resulted in significant delays that caused harm to the requestor. 4 Improper delays in releasing records and improper withholdings of records frustrate the twin public policy pillars of FOIA, transparency and oversight. 5 Agencies are disinclined to promote transparency and oversight because doing so invites unwanted scrutiny and adverse consequences. While Congress permits 6 and requires 7 agency interpretation of numerous FOIA terms and provisions, it imposes a non-deferential de novo standard of review to agency rulemakings and adjudications made under the statute. 8 Such standard of review is appropriate for a statute of general agency applicability because it conveys an absence of authoritative delegation. This Article proposes that the de novo standard of review provision of FOIA is diminished by the inefficiency and tension created by the statute's interpretive delegations, which are typically reviewed under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9 The result of the inefficiency is diminished efficacy that survives the latest decennial amendment to the FOIA statute, the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. 10 To resolve the discrepancy between agency interpretation and de novo review, this Article makes the case that Congress should approach FOIA reform with greater legislative precision.
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Part I identifies the adverse public policy effects of Congress's choice to confer non-deferential interpretive authority of FOIA upon agencies, coupled with the natural disincentives agencies have to exercise such interpretive authority to promote compliance with the statute. Part II examines the tension and inefficiency of FOIA's judicial review provisions in the context of the broader statutory scheme of agency-delegated interpretation. It suggests that courts may not be reviewing FOIA adjudications and rules de novo as a result of this inefficiency. Part III addresses various counterarguments and alternatives to our views. 6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa) (2012) (conferring discretion to engage in rulemaking to determine administrative appeal deadline in excess of ninety day statutory minimum); id. § 552(a)(6)(B)(iv) (conferring permissive individual authority to aggregate certain classes of requests to reduce duplication of processing efforts); id. § 552(a)(6)(D)(i) (conferring permissive individual agency authority to engage in rulemaking to incorporate and interpret multitrack processing).
7. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (requiring agencies to engage in interpretive rulemaking regarding circumstances that merit expedited processing of requests). 12 While other statutes applicable to administrative agencies contain oversight provisions, 13 FOIA is unique in that its purpose is to facilitate transparency and oversight of agencies.
14 That oversight function creates natural tension with agencies that have disincentives to liberally comply with FOIA's goals and purposes. 15 When agencies do not comply with FOIA's mandates, information is withheld from the public, requesters face long delays from agencies forcing litigation to ensure compliance, and the purpose of the statute is frustrated. 16 The problem is compounded by agency motivation to withhold records that are harmful, embarrassing, or politically inconvenient. 17 
A. Executive Branch Disincentives to Compliance
Executive branch disincentives to comply with the provisions and purposes of FOIA can cause individual agencies to interpret the statute's ambiguities and gaps narrowly and in favor of nondisclosure. 19 Judicial correction of such agency behavior took place in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission. 20 In that case, the Cause of Action Institute, a non-profit oversight organization, filed three successive, superseding, FOIA requests with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"), seeking information that it intended to use to develop investigative reports that could be critical of the Commission.
21
Cause of Action sought a fee waiver by asserting that the request was seeking information "in the public interest," and, alternatively, a fee classification that would result in a reduction of fees by asserting that it was a "representative of is released."); see Morrison, supra note 16, at 1546 ("But it is precisely those documents whose disclosure is not in the interest of at least some officials that FOIA makes available as a matter of law." (emphasis added)); Kwoka, supra note 15, at 202 ("Agencies have often been found to have failed to release records to cover up their mistakes, embarrassing acts, or misconduct."); see also Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 469 (2015) .
Even though President Obama declared in his memorandum on FOIA that 'the Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears,' agencies continue to invoke exemptions as frequently as in the past, if not more often.
Id.
18. See FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, supra note 15, at 39 ("[U]nresponsive agencies lack effective incentives to make improvement . . . [l] egislation is needed to clarify existing requirements and impose additional requirements that will ensure agencies to comply with legal obligations to make government public."); Morrison, supra note 16, at 1549 ("The bureaucracy will never be enthusiastic about FOIA, but it is worth exploring alternatives that will overcome the inevitable resistance without harming significant interests that are protected by FOIA's legitimate exemptions.").
19. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 6 (2001) (rejecting agency posture that certain documents were exempt from disclosure on the basis that they were "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" protected by the workproduct and deliberative process privileges); U.S. 
24
A district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC, relying upon the agency's regulations and other legal interpretations. 25 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the lower court's-and by extension, the agency's-erroneous interpretations of the fee classifications. 26 With regard to the public interest fee waiver, the Court stated that while "[t]he FTC regulation cited by the district court does require a requester to show that the information it seeks would increase the understanding of the public 'at large[,]' . . . FOIA itself does not." 27 Upon analyzing the FTC's interpretation of the "representative of the news media" fee classification, the court identified two problems with the FTC's regulation and the district court's decision. First, the FTC and district court required that each FOIA request be of potential interest to a segment of the public-yet, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the proper test focused on whether the requester gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public. 28 Second, the FTC and the district court employed the FTC's erroneous and OMB-parroted interpretation of the fee classification, requiring that the requester be "organized especially around dissemination," 29 an interpretive requirement that was superseded by the OPEN Government Act of 2007. "representative of the news media fee" category that varied from the OMB guidelines and the FTC's interpretation.
31
For nearly ten years, FOIA has entitled an individual or organization to a "news media" fee status if the requester: "[(1)] gathers information of potential interest [(2)] to a segment of the public, [(3)] uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and [(4)] distributes that work [(5)] to an audience."
32 After the commencement of litigation in Cause of Action, the FTC promulgated a new "representative of the news media" fee regulation that conformed to the 2007 FOIA amendment. 33 Nonetheless, it continued to press the validity of its prior regulation in litigation.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that while some of the FTC's problems could be attributed to FOIA amendments that had not yet been interpreted by the courts, it held the agency accountable for employing erroneous FOIA interpretations. 34 Given the court's rebuke in Cause of Action, it is reasonable to infer that the FTC wrongfully denied advantageous fee classifications to other requesters even though they were entitled to those classifications for quite some time, and in so doing, stifled transparency. 35 Less than one year later, a different D.C. Circuit panel held another agency accountable for misreading another portion of the same FOIA fee provision, 36 one that advantages educational institutions that are engaging in scholarly research. 37 In Sack v. United States Department of Defense, 38 the court once more rejected an agency regulation that parroted the OMB's Reagan-era 1987 guidelines, though the interpretation had not been superseded by statute. 39 The court disagreed with the government's narrow reading of the term "educational institution" that permitted teachers, but excluded students, from taking advantage of the fee classification provision. 
B. FOIA Reform and Executive Stonewalling
Although Congress acted in 2007 to carefully define the "news media" fee waiver category, 41 it failed to define other FOIA provisions with similar clarity.
42 It amended FOIA again on June 30, 2016, by enacting the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which (1) requires agencies to automatically make electronically available any records which have been requested (and produced) at least three times, (2) codifies the Department of Justice's "reasonably foreseeable harm" standard, 43 (3) forbids agencies from assessing search fees if they miss production deadlines, 44 and (4) news-advocacy/new-documents-show-the-obama-admin-aggressive ly-lobbied-to-kill-transparency-reform-in-congress/ (detailing how the Obama administration lobbied against a 2014 bill that would have given Congress more oversight to ensure agencies were complying with FOIA).
47. For example, FOIA confers discretion to agencies regarding whether to implement the multitrack processing of requests based on the volume of work or time required in responding to a request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(D) (2012) (stating that agencies can "provid[e] for multitrack processing of requests for records based on the amount of work or time (or both) involved in processing requests."). The idea behind multitrack processing is that "larger numbers of requests for smaller amounts of material will be completed more quickly," and "[r]equesters will also have an incentive to frame narrower requests."
Introduction to FOIA, FOIADVOCATES, http://www. foiadvocates.com/intro.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The absence of consistent multitracking requesters will continue to be wrongfully denied records or improperly assessed fees based on erroneous agency interpretations.
Further illustrating the point that agencies have strong disincentives to comply with FOIA, presidential administrations have vehemently opposed and even lobbied against congressional efforts to enact FOIA reform. President Lyndon Johnson's administration fought hard to stall the statute's original enactment in the 1960s, as did every agency that offered congressional testimony on the legislation that would become FOIA. 48 Despite executive branch resistance, FOIA passed both houses of Congress by a nearly unanimous margin. 49 the Presidential Records Act, 54 and his Attorney General, John Ashcroft, directed agencies in 2001 to make all discretionary FOIA disclosures only "after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure." 55 Under President Obama, who famously committed to create "an unprecedented level of openness in Government," 56 agencies set records for denying or redacting requests, backlogged requests increased, and the number of full-time FOIA employees decreased. 57 Ironically, documents that were obtained via a journalist's FOIA request revealed that the Obama administration played a significant role in defeating bipartisan FOIA reform that had widespread support, the FOIA Oversight and Implementation Act of 2014. 58 To his credit, though, President Obama signed the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 into law. 59 Though agencies and presidential administrations praise FOIA and open government principles, they also quietly endeavor to undermine FOIA's purposes. 60 Rather than permit agencies and presidential administrations that 
C. De Novo Review
FOIA's de novo review provision is weakened by the remainder of the statute. The concept that an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administered is entitled to deference is a well-tread norm of administrative law. 61 Conversely, de novo review is generally reserved for agency decisions and interpretations to which courts owe no deference. 62 However, FOIA's provisions expressly permit and instruct agencies to fill gaps, while also imposing de novo review on agencies' exercise of such interpretive authority. 63 Upon Article III review, should not receive deference 65 because FOIA is a statute that is not organic to any agency. 66 Due to the fact that FOIA applies to all government agencies, this system empowers agencies to have varying interpretations of the same provision. Inconsistent FOIA implementation across the executive branch is inefficient and inequitable because FOIA requesters are at the mercy of occasionally arbitrary agency-specific interpretations of the statute, to the detriment of transparency. The fact that over 100 agencies implement varying interpretations of ambiguous FOIA provisions in a manner that leads to administrative inter-decisional inconsistency further suggests that Congress should not employ such uncertain terms in FOIA. 67 The only practical recourse for such agency behavior is Article III review. Litigation can be a difficult proposition for requesters due to its expense and duration. Only sophisticated and well-financed requestors have the capability to launch multi-year litigation that can involve successive rounds of dispositive motions, only to gain access to documents that have diminished news value due to their untimeliness. News media challenges to FOIA denials are infrequent because most news media, and especially new media outlets, operate on a shoestring budget.
68 Accordingly, non-profit organizations that are replete with expertise in administrative law tend to be the most effective in utilizing litigation to achieve judicial correction of erroneous interpretations of the statute. 69 65. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842 (applying Chevron deference only when "a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers"); Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1313 ("[H]owever, we emphasize that we owe no particular deference to the IRS's interpretation of FOIA."); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("It is true that we will not defer to an agency's view of FOIA's meaning."). But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (directing that "a court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the agency's determination as to" matters such as technical feasibility, reproducibility, and FOIA exemption determinations).
66. But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (requiring the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, a unit within the Executive Office of the President, to provide for a uniform schedule of fees that is binding on all agencies through notice and comment rulemaking).
67. THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP, SECOND OPEN GOVERNMENT NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Dec. 5, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/us_national_action_plan_6p.pdf ("More than 100 Federal agencies are subject to FOIA.").
See generally Media Making Fewer Challenges to Government Secrecy in Federal
Court, THE FOIA PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/03/14/media-making-fewer-chal lenges-to-government-secrecy-in-federal-court/ ("Newsroom budgets have been slashed so it is no surprise that there is less time to pursue freedom of information litigation and less willingness to put time into stories where government may delay responding for long beyond the statutory limits.").
69. By including de novo review in FOIA, Congress intended to place primary authority to interpret FOIA's provisions with the courts.
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A principal congressional concern regarding the precursor to FOIA was that no judicial review was available to challenge request denials. 71 Congress determined that de novo review was essential to avoid courts' "meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." 72 Congress considered de novo review so important to FOIA's implementation that it amended the statute to supersede a Supreme Court decision which had ruled that in camera review of documents for national security exemptions was not permitted. 73 In EPA v. Mink, 74 the Court held that Congress had not intended for in camera review of an agency's withholding of documents under the executive security-now the national security-exemption solely by requiring de novo review. 75 Congress quickly amended FOIA to provide for in camera review in demonstration of its preference for de novo review.
76

D. Empirical Data
Empirical data of Article III affirmation rates in FOIA challenges raises the possibility that the congressional desire for de novo review, in which courts do mpirical studies demonstrate that the de novo review standard on the books in FOIA cases is not the standard used in practice."); Verkuil, supra note 13, at 713 ("In maintaining this modest reversal rate over such a long time and for so many cases, one has to ask whether the courts have ignored the de novo standard. District courts seem to affirm FOIA cases almost instinctively, and by so doing have produced a real world reversal rate that is closer to the hypothesized arbitrary and capricious standard.").
FOIA reversal rates could be skewed by a number of factors. FOIA litigation is rare, 85 and the cases that reach district court merits determinations are greatly affected by a number of decisions requesters made along the way. 86 Requesters are also at a disadvantage in that the agency is in the unique position of being the only party with knowledge of what the requested records contain. 87 Requesters are seldom allowed access to the traditional tools of civil discovery in FOIA litigation. 88 The government also has a lopsided advantage of having superior institutional knowledge of litigating the statute, with a single agency, the Department of Justice, defending all FOIA challenges. Moreover, the government deploys its federal courts knowledge and subject-matter expertise to render moot some FOIA challenges that could give rise to decisions that are favorable to the requester, while pressing forward with litigation that could provide it with favorable case law. 89 Additionally, FOIA directs courts to give "substantial weight" to an agency affidavit concerning a denial based on technical feasibility, reproducibility, and most notably, exemptions. 90 There is also the possibility that requesters do not take all of these factors into account when deciding to pursue FOIA litigation, and that courts are more likely to affirm agency FOIA determinations than other matters they review de novo because requesters are taking poor litigating positions. 91 The fact that FOIA reversal rates rest at approximately ten percent of decided cases appears to undermine congressional intent for courts not to serially approve agency FOIA determinations. 92 To more fully effectuate the goals and purposes of FOIA, Congress should not only reinforce the notion that all FOIA determinations must be subject to searching de novo review, but also mitigate some of the unique factors that could be leading to below-average FOIA reversal rates.
II. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES
A. Courts are Properly Applying De Novo Review in FOIA Cases
While this Article suggests that courts may not actually review FOIA cases de novo, some may argue that courts apply this standard properly and that other factors contribute to the unanticipated low reversal rate. First, some argue that the low reversal rate could be an effect of the number of FOIA denials that are actually challenged in court. 93 Between 2001 and 2015, requesters filed between 300 and 500 lawsuits challenging denials per year out of the tens of thousands of requests made per year. 94 A disproportionately small number of FOIA lawsuits should not contribute to the unexpectedly low reversal rate.
Professor Margaret B. Kwoka also suggests that requesters' decisions both pre-and post-filing of FOIA lawsuits skew the reversal rate. 95 For instance, Professor Kwoka notes that many cases are voluntarily dismissed or settled before reaching merits determinations. 96 Professor Verkuil theorizes that the parties take the de novo standard of review into account when deciding whether to litigate, 97 which could influence the government's willingness to litigate denials unless it is confident in its decision. 98 Professor Kwoka posits that the government has an additional incentive to obtain favorable FOIA precedent because it is a repeat player in such litigation. 99 These theories suggest the possibility that FOIA denials are only ever fully litigated, generally speaking, when the government is confident in its denial of the request and has a strong interest in defending that denial. This would lead to a reversal rate much lower than the hypothesized rate.
While these theories could explain the low reversal rate to some extent, they lack empirical support to explain or isolate particular causes-to be clear, this theory has not been empirically-tested either. This Article agrees with these factors, but believe that this theory, that judicial misapplication of de novo, 95. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 206 ("Huge numbers of cases are never filed, are voluntarily dismissed before an adjudication, or are settled between the parties, and the outcomes of those cases that are adjudicated are skewed by the decisions the litigants made along the way.").
96. Id. 97. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 688-89. 98. The government may also be more confident in defending its FOIA decisions because the statute requires courts to give substantial weight to agency affidavits regarding denials based on FOIA exemptions, technical feasibility, and reproducibility. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
99. Kwoka, supra note 15, at 209 ("[T]he government's strategic advantages as a repeat player and long-term goal of procuring favorable precedent over a short-term victory are likely to skew the pre-adjudication selection effect and contribute to the government's high success rate.").
review also contributes to low reversal rates in FOIA cases. As suggested by Professor Richard Pierce, because it would be irrational for courts to ignore why an agency withheld requested records, courts probably do not ignore such reasons, and therefore, de novo review does not truly occur. 100 Under this theory, the court is improperly applying FOIA's de novo standard, thereby undermining the efficacy of its judicial review provision. 101 
B. Courts Should Not Apply De Novo Review for All Exemption Categories
The plain language of the statute provides that a denial of a request for records based on any of nine exempted classes is subject to de novo review.
expressed the benefits of de novo review of all denials, and it should not subject certain exemptions to less stringent standards simply to conform the standard to reality or in an attempt to achieve a higher level of review for other exemptions.
III. CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Merrick Garland's opinion on behalf of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cause of Action v. Federal Trade Commission has shone an emblematic light on the consequences of a pervasive methodological problem with FOIA-Congress's failure to enact specific terms and provisions in favor of amending the statute in generally broad language. Congress again missed an opportunity to mitigate this problem when it passed the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. Agencies have natural disincentives to liberally comply with FOIA's goals and strictures because the statute is omnibus in nature and encourages agency transparency and oversight. The statute's provisions permitting or requiring agency interpretation are inefficient because they are internally inconsistent with its de novo standard of review. Enacting more specific terms and provisions, thereby removing the necessity for agency interpretation, will cure this inconsistency and promote greater government transparency and oversight.
